Security and Standard C Libraries

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Agenda

- Current Situation
- Security Problems
- Library impact
- Proposed Changes
- Related C++ issues
- Summary
- Q&A

Libraries Background

- Standard C Library initially evolved with Unix™
 - Starting in 1970s
 - Public networking uncommon
 - Machines simpler, more constrained
- First C language/library standard codified existing practice
 - High degree of compatibility with current use
 - Core set of required functions for C programmers

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Current situation

- Public networking extremely common
- Motivated attackers common
 - Direct hacking
 - Social engineering (malicious spam)
- Firewalls not enough to protect network software
 - Laptops move in and out of firewall
 - Wireless networks allow promiscuous binding

Security implications

- Security is now critical for the whole software industry
- Much code that was previously unimportant now vulnerable to attack
- Assume every software component might be attacked
- Security issues require urgent attention
 - Software vendors issuing patches regularly
 - Locked-down customers need to deploy updates or workarounds

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Improving the Situation

- Short Term
 - Be responsive
 - Have great security process
- Medium Term
 - Threat modelling
 - Security review
 - Defense in depth
 - Defaulting to security

Improving the Situation

- Long term
 - Development improvements
 - Better libraries
 - · Better coding practices
 - Better development standards
 - Better trained developers
 - Better quality assurance
 - No single panacea
 - Standard C Libraries a core part of this plan
 - Need to make breaking changes
 - Help drive improvements across all deployed code

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Key security problems

- Buffer overruns
- Error reporting
- Parameter validation
- File access rights
- Static buffer results

Security issues

- Standard-defined interface problems
 - Function shape is dangerous
 - New function needed
- Standard-defined implementation problems
 - Function requirements are dangerous
 - Existing function can change
- Standard-agnostic implementation problems
 - Standard change not required, may be useful

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Standard Interface problems

- Lack of buffer size
 - fgets
- Lack of error return
 - Continue after error can be attackable
- Callback context needed
 - Avoid static variables
 - Safe for reentrancy, threads
 - qsort, bsearch

Standard interface problems

- Never use static result buffers
 - Can overrun
 - tmpnam
- Random number quality
 - Can allow predictable attacks
 - New name since different performance
 - Rand

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Standard implementation problems

- Returning unterminated strings
 - Predictable, but hard to get right
 - Strncpy

Quality of Implementation issues

- Parameter validation
 - Ensure errors reported
 - Provide way to catch errors
 - We will have handler function
 - assert in "debug" build
- Stack usage
 - Avoid excessive usage
 - Stack overflow can be a denial of service attack

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Quality of Implementation issues

- File permissions
 - Create temporary files safely
 - Create all files by default with good permissions
- Scanf
 - No totally safe way to implement this
 - Consider requiring buffer sizes
- Long file path support
 - Don't fail when given extended paths
 - Windows specific

Our Secure Libraries

- Reviewing all 2000 C and C++ library functions
 - Includes many MS extensions
- Creating around 400 secure variants
- Variants follow secure coding rules
- Will not make an application secure
 - But will help build one
 - Removes need for user to build secure replacements

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Our secure libraries

- Give the developer option to deprecate insecure functions
 - Deprecate by default
 - __declspec(deprecate) in VC++
 - Causes a compiler warning
 - Allow deprecation to be removed
 - Using a #define
 - Makes us secure by default

Example

• Old:

```
- size_t mbstowcs
(
    wchar t *wcstr,
    const_char *mbstr,
    size_t count
);
• New:
- errcode mbstowcs_s
(
    size_t *pConvertedMBChars,
    wchar t *wcstr,
    size t sizeInWords,
    const char *mbstr,
    size_t count
);
```

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Scope of changes

- Most functions change implementation
 - For validation
 - For quality of implementation issues
- 37 functions have some interface shape change
 - Not time to review them all here
 - Details in my paper proposal
 - List on next page

Functions changing

- bsearch, qsort
 - Pass context
- tmpnam, getenv, strtok, ctime
 - Don't use static state
- rand
 - Crypto-safe
- fgets, gets, vsprintf, strerror, strncat. Wcsncat, strncpy, wcsncpy, wcstombs, mbstowcs
 - Buffer size

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Functions changing

- memcpy, wmemcpy, memmove, wmemmove
 - Separate dest size
- fscanf, scanf, wscanf, sscanf, swscanf
 - scanf family problems
- setbuf, sprintf, strcat, strcpy, wcscat, wcscpy
 - Deprecate
 - Better versions already in standard

Secure Libraries Questions

- Deprecate by default?
- Integer multiplication
- Naming convention
 - mbstowcs (old)
 - mbstowcs_s (new) OR
 - mbstowcsn (new)
- Change names always, or only for interface changes
 - Non-interface changes include more rigorous validation
- Error return
 - Provide alternative error mechanisms
- scanf family

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C++ Library

- Early stages of planning
- Less changes required
 - Newer library
 - Less direct buffer manipulation
- Existing fixes
 - operator << into char []</pre>
 - Replace with alternative mechanism
 - Validation
 - Bounds checking
 - Quality of implementation issues
 - Other small changes

C++ Library (2)

- New classes
 - Secret buffer
 - Erases after use
 - alloca replacement
 - size-checked stack array
 - Overrun detection wrappers
 - Path handling
 - URL
 - Disk

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Summary

- Time to make the C library secure
- Help developers move their code forward to secure practices
- Exemplar implementation being built now
 - Will be available for trialing/review soon
 - My dev team is building right now

Questions?

- Follow-up:
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